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ARBITRATION COSTS AND FORUM ACCESSIBILITY:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Christopher R. Drahozal*
"Arbitration is one of the most cost-effective means of resolving
disputes."
-SenatorJeff Sessions (R-Ala.)'
"The greatest strength of arbitration is that the average person can
afford it."
-Lewis Maltby, National Workrights Institute
2
"[Flor people who are victims of consumer rip-offs and workplace
injustices, arbitration costs much more than litigation-so much
more that it becomes impossible to vindicate your rights."
-Joan Claybrook, Public Citizen s
INTRODUCTION
So which is it? Is arbitration cheaper than litigation, or more ex-
pensive? Does arbitration enhance access to justice for consumers
* John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. This Article
is based on a presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in New York on January 4, 2008. Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar for organizing the
panel, and to my co-panelists for helpful discussions. I also appreciate helpful comments on
this topic from Paul Bland, Bo Rutledge,Jean Sternlight, Steve Ware, and Mark Weidemaier,
and Pam Tull's help in tracking down several of the studies discussed in this Article.
1. 153 CONG. REC. S4614 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
2. Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbi-
tration, in How ADR WORKS 915, 926 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).
3. PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION MORE EXPENSIVE THAN COURT (May 1, 2002),
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/print.release.cfm?ID=1098. Public Citizen criticized
arbitration as too expensive and as precluding individuals from bringing claims in its report
The Costs of Arbitration. See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.PDF [hereinafter THE COSTS OF
ARBITRATION]. For comments on the Public Citizen study, see Samuel Estreicher & Matt
Ballard, Affordable-Justice Through Arbitration: A Critique of Public Citizen Jeremiad on the "Cost of
Arbitration," Disp. REsOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 8; Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen,
Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. I.. REv. 761, 770 (2003); AM. ARBITRATION
AsS'N, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER
AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION (Jan. 2003).
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and employees, or does it prevent them from vindicating their le-
gal rights?
In this Article, written for this symposium issue on "Empirical
Studies of Mandatory Arbitration," I examine the available empiri-
cal evidence on these two questions.4  I take "mandatory
arbitration" to refer to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
and employment (and maybe franchise5) contracts.6 Accordingly, I
limit my consideration of the empirical evidence to those types of
4. For other surveys of empirical research on arbitration costs and forum accessibility,
see Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmers
Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 353-59 (2006); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research
on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMp. POL'YJ.
405, 424-25 (2007); Kirk D. Jensen, Summaries of Empirical Studies and Surveys Regarding How
Individuals Fare in Arbitration, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 631 (2006); Peter B. Rutledge,
Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2008).
5. The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 would make pre-dispute arbitration
clauses unenforceable in franchise (as well as consumer and employment) contracts. See
H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4, (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
6. Consumer and employee advocates use the phrase "mandatory arbitration" to re-
fer to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts-as compared
to "voluntary arbitration" between sophisticated parties. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Manda-
tory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1632 n.1 (2005). According to Jean
Sternlight, for example, "it is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration volun-
tarily agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial
arbitration forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through
the use of form contracts." Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Su-
preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642-43 (1996). In fact,
this usage of "mandatory arbitration" is a misnomer. True "mandatory" arbitration is arbitra-
tion mandated or required by law, not arbitration provided for in a standard form contract.
As the leading arbitration treatise explains:
[Terms such as "compulsory" or "mandatory arbitration"] are properly, that is, clearly,
used to describe arbitration imposed on the parties by law with no consent or mani-
festations of consent. Sometimes, however, they are used by judges or others
respecting consensual arbitration such as FAA arbitration. This tends to happen when
the person using the term is concerned about the circumstances that generated the
consent, or about the genuineness of consent manifested, as in adhesion contracts.
These concerns and their being raised are, of course, perfectly legitimate, as is a rec-
ognition of the coercive character of consenting to be bound by contracts. Where,
however, the very issue is the genuineness of consent or the harshness of the alterna-
tives to consent, using such terms as compulsory or mandatory in such circumstances is,
at best, highly confusing. At worst, it constitutes question-begging: The very question
at stake where such questions arise is whether whatever consent to arbitrate as has
been manifested should or should not be given full contractual effect. To call the ar-
bitration compulsory or mandatory is to answer by label, not by attention to the facts
and by analysis. It is far better to call these terms "pre-dispute" arbitration agree-
ments.
IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 17.1.2.2, at 17:8-17:9 (Supp. 1999).
Nonetheless, the phrase certainly has become part of common usage, to the point where
businesses actually use the phrase in their arbitration clauses. E.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting arbitration clause in T-Mobile con-
tract).
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contracts. I do not discuss empirical studies of international arbi-
trations, which almost always arise out of agreements between
commercial entities.7 Nor do I discuss empirical studies of court-
annexed arbitrations, which may not derive from party agreement
and do not ordinarily proceed to a binding award."
As others have commented,9 the empirical evidence on the cost
of arbitration is limited, although the number of studies has in-
creased in recent years. The challenges of empirical research in
this area certainly have not diminished. In particular, as with all
attempts to compare arbitration with litigation, researchers face
the challenge of selection bias-parties choose between litigation
and arbitration, likely leading to different types of cases ending up
in litigation than in arbitration and vice versa. ° As a consequence,
definitive conclusions on the comparative cost of arbitration and
litigation, as well as on the accessibility of arbitration to consumers
and employees, are difficult to reach.
Subject to this caveat, the available empirical evidence suggests
the following tentative conclusions. First, the upfront costs of arbi-
tration will in many cases be higher than, and at best be the same
as, the upfront costs in litigation. Whether arbitration is less costly
than litigation thus depends on how attorneys' fees and other costs
compare, and the evidence here is inconclusive. Second, for em-
ployees and consumers with small and mid-sized claims, the
7. See TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Draho-
zal & Naimark] (collecting empirical studies on international commercial arbitration).
8. Hiere I differ from Rutledge, supra note 4, at 55 ("Even accepting the above-noted
differences between court-annexed and commercial arbitration, none appears fatal to the
explanatory value of the research. If anything, the differences between the two regimes
suggest that commercial arbitration could generate even larger reductions in process costs."
(citation omitted)). My view is that parties are likely to behave differently in court-annexed
arbitration than they are in binding arbitration proceedings, as the binding nature of the
result gives them a greater incentive to invest resources in the outcome than they might in
non-binding court-annexed arbitrations.
9. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory
Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399, 405 (2000) ("What little empirical
evidence that does exist shows that the costs of using arbitration are unpredictable because
economic and non-economic factors dictate the actions of parties."); Steven Walt, Decision by
Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 369, 406
(1999) ("The little impressionistic empirical evidence available suggests that commercial
arbitration costs are no lower systematically than litigation costs.").
10. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of
Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. REsOL. 735, 757 (2001) ("Empirical studies
are vulnerable to the possibility that the studied cases going to arbitration are systematically
different from the studied cases going to litigation."); David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case
for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1565
(2005) ("Critical research design concerns persist, however, as the stream of adjudicated and
litigated cases is likely to differ systematically.").
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availability of low-cost arbitration makes arbitration an accessible
forum, and possibly a more accessible forum than litigation. But
for consumers with large claims, and for employees not able to use
low-cost arbitration, the evidence is less clear. For such claimants,
administrative fees and arbitrators' fees likely will exceed court fil-
ing fees. The question is whether other cost savings in arbitration
offset the higher upfront costs. Moreover, even if arbitration is
more affordable on net, it still may not be a more accessible forum
than litigation. Accessibility depends not only on dispute resolu-
tion costs, but also on expected recoveries. Third, whether
arbitration is an accessible forum for claims that can only be
brought on a class basis remains uncertain. The extent of such
claims, as well as whether class arbitration is a suitable substitute
for class actions, needs further research.
Part I provides an overview of the costs of arbitration, illustrated
using the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). It also discusses the empirical evidence on how parties
modify those rules by contract. Part II considers the available stud-
ies on how the costs of arbitration compare to the costs of
litigation. Part III looks more directly at the question of whether
arbitration is an accessible forum for consumers and employees.
Finally, Part IV examines the limited empirical evidence on the use
of class arbitration as a substitute for class actions in court.
I. OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION COSTS
Arbitration is private dispute resolution. Unlike in litigation,
which is subsidized by the government through its provision of
courts, the parties bear the full costs of the arbitration process."
Those costs have three main components: administrative fees
charged by the arbitration provider, if any; fees charged by the ar-
bitrator or arbitrators; and attorneys' fees and other litigation
costs. This section provides an overview of each of these costs.
11. E.g., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Defenders and Proponents Square Off on
New Report, 20 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. 91, 104 (2002) (quoting India
Johnson, Vice President, American Arbitration Association) ("It's a private service provided
on an individual basis and paid for case-by-case."). But seeJeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST.J. ON DisP. RESOL. 297, 358 (1996) (arguing that government subsi-
dizes private dispute resolution to some degree).
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A. Administrative Fees (including Cost-Shifting Rules and Waivers)
The first component of the costs of arbitration is the fee charged
by the provider that administers the arbitration, if any.12 To illus-
trate, Table 1 sets out the administrative fees under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation.13 As is common, the administrative fees vary with the
amount in dispute-the higher the amount in dispute, the higher
the fee. For large claims the administrative fees can be substantially
higher than court filing fees: a claimant bringing a $500,001 claim
in arbitration will have to pay a $6000 filing fee and a $2500 case
service fee, while the fee for filing suit in federal court is $350 re-
gardless of the amount in dispute.
TABLE 1
FEE SCHEDULE-AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
5
Amount of Claim Initial Filing Fee Case Service Fee
Above $0 to $10,000 $750 $200
Above $10,000 to $75,000 $950 $300
Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1800 $750
Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2750 $1250
Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4250 $1750
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6000 $2500
Above $1,000,000 to $8000 $3250
$5,000,000
Above $5,000,000 to $10,000 $4000
$10,000,000
Above $10,000,000 $12,500 plus .01% of amount $6000
above $10,000,000
(capped at $65,000)
All the major arbitration providers now offer some form of low-
cost arbitration for consumers and employees. 6 For example, the
12. Parties that do not contract for the use of a provider organization's services obvi-
ously do not need to pay fees to such an organization. These parties, however, would likely
face increased arbitrators' fees because the arbitrator will have to provide some degree of
administrative services.
13. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 133, 135-46 (2004) (surveying leading institutional rules).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000).
15. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures
(amended and effective Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440
[hereinafter Commercial Arbitration Rules) (under section entitled "Administrative Fees").
16. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures (ef-
fective Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (Rule C-8)
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AAA caps the combined administrative and arbitrators' fees for
consumer claims of up to $10,000 at a total of $125 and for con-
sumer claims of up to $75,000 at a total of $375.7 The business pays
any costs above the cap. Consumer claims above $75,000 are sub-
ject to the standard commercial fee schedule in Table 1. For
employees who arbitrate under employer-promulgated plans (as
opposed to individually-negotiated employment contracts), the
AAA caps the fee for the employee at $150, with the employer pay-
ing the rest of the administrative and arbitrators' fees.'8
Some empirical evidence is available on the administrative fees
actually paid by parties in consumer and employment arbitrations.
According to Elizabeth Hill, the mean filing fee for employees ar-
bitrating under employer-promulgated plans before the AAA was
$376, while the mean hearing fee for such arbitrations was $210.9
Her data predate the low-cost arbitration described above, and so
likely overstate the amount employees would pay today. Mark Fel-
lows of the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) reports the
arbitration fees paid by consumers and businesses in NAF arbitra-
tions in California from 2003-2004 as follows: consumers bringing
claims against businesses paid an average of $46.63 in fees, while
businesses bringing claims against consumers paid an average of
$149.50 in fees.2°
Arbitration rules commonly provide both that (1) the provider
organization will waive the administrative fees upon a sufficient
[hereinafter Consumer Rules]; JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-
Dispute Clauses: Minimum Standards of Fairness 7 (revised Jan. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/consumer_minstd.asp ("[W]hen a consumer initiates arbi-
tration against the company, the only fee required to be paid by the consumer is $250,
which is approximately equivalent to current Court filing fees."); Nat'l Arbitration Forum,
Fee Schedule to Code of Procedure (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/resource.aspx?id=606 (For consumer claimants, the consumer "pays the Filing
Fee and one-half the fee for a Participatory Hearing selected by the Consumer up to a total
of $250 (two hundred fifty dollars), unless otherwise provided by agreement of the Parties
or by applicable law.").
17. In addition, the AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol permits consumers the op-
tion of going to small claims court instead of arbitrating small claims. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Consumer Due Process Protocol (Apr. 17, 1998), available at http:/./www.adr.org/sp.asp?
id=22019 (Principle 5).
18. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures
(amended and effective July 1, 2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904
(Costs of Arbitration (including AAA Administrative Fees) For Disputes Arising Out of Em-
ployer-Promulgated Plans).
19. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777,
798, 812 (2003).
20. Mark Fellows, The Same Result As In Court, More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and
Court Litigation Outcomes, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 2006, at 32, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/July/32.pdf.
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showing of hardship 2' and (2) the arbitrator can reallocate the ad-
ministrative costs (and arbitrators' fees) in the award.22 I am not
aware of any empirical evidence on how often or under what con-
ditions waivers are granted. Some evidence is available on the
extent to which cost-shifting rules are used. According to Hill:
AAA employment arbitrators exercised their discretion to re-
allocate arbitrator's fees to the employer in 70.25% of the
cases, hearing fees in 71.3% of the cases, and some or all of
the filing fees in 85.12% of the cases. Thus, virtually all forum
costs were reallocated to the employer in 70.25% of the
23cases.
By comparison, a study of securities arbitration awards by O'Neal
and Solin found that in 3956 out of 13,810 (28.6%) cases "arbitra-
tion panels awarded claimants nothing but assessed forum fees to
claimants."24 The average administrative fee in those cases was
$2742. 5
B. Arbitrators'Fees
The second component of arbitration costs is the fee charged by
the arbitrators. Unlike in litigation, where the government pays the
judges' salaries, the parties themselves must pay the arbitrators.
The arbitrators' fees are not included in the administrative charges
of the AAA under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, although the
capped amount the consumer or employee has to pay under the
AAA's consumer and employment rules covers both administrative
fees and arbitrators' fees, as described above. 6
In 2001, the AAA conducted a series of surveys concerning the
fees charged by arbitrators on its commercial and employment
21. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators, avail-
able at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22040 (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
22. E.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 15 (Rule R-43(c)).
23. Hill, supra note 19, at 812. Again, the data predate the AAA's low-cost employment
arbitration.
24. Edward S. O'Neal & Daniel R. Solin, Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes:
A Statistical Analysis of How Claimants Fare 17 (2007), available at http://www.slcg.com/
pdf/news/Mandatory% 20Arbitration % 20Study.pdf.
25. Id.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. Indeed, the AAA applies the consumer's
or employee's payment solely to the arbitrators' fees. See Consumer Rules, supra note 16
(Rule C-8).
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panels. 7 Table 2 summarizes the results. The mean and median
fees of the responding arbitrators exceeded $1000 per day, and
ranged as high as $5000 per day for one commercial arbitrator. Al-
though most of the respondents were members of the AAA's
commercial panel, the fees of survey respondents from the AAA's
employment panel did not differ materially.
TABLE 2
ARBITRATORS' FEES IN AAA ARBITRATIONS
28
AAA Panel Mean Median Range n
(per day) (per day) (per day)
Chicago, IL Commercial $1800 $1698 $750-$5000 60
Colorado Commercial $1442 $1500 $600-$2500 38
Hamilton County, OH Commercial $1468 $1400 $600-$2100 31
Indiana Commercial $1308 $1225 $700-1800 26
VA, NC, MD, DC Employment $1403 $1500 $700-$2000 15
That arbitrators typically charge these fees does not necessarily
mean that consumers and employees pay those amounts. First, for
small consumer claims and employee claims under promulgated
plans, the amount of fees is capped.29 Second, some arbitrators are
willing to serve pro bono, although the number of cases in which
arbitrators do so in consumer and employment cases is not re-
ported .
27. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 729, 737-38 (2006) (summarizing findings).
28. The sources for data in the table are the following: Affidavit of Frank Zotto 113,
Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity, Case No. 01 CH 1944 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2001) (reporting
results of "random sampling of 60 arbitrators on the Commercial Panel in the Chicago,
Illinois area"); Affidavit of Frank Zotto 1 10, Pope v. AutoNation USA, Case No. A-0001609
(Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Aug. 15, 2001) (reporting results of "sampling of 31 arbitrators on the
Commercial Panel in Hamilton County, Ohio"); Affidavit of Christine Newhall 6, Cowart v.
Credit Counselors Corp., Case No. IPOO-0701 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2001) (reporting results of
"random sampling of 26 arbitrators on the Commercial Panel in the State of Indiana");
Affidavit of Frank Zotto 9, Calvo v. PIA Merch. Co., Case No. 2: 0 0cv873 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4,
2001) (reporting results of "sampling of 15 arbitrators on the Employment Panel in the
Virginia, North Carolina, Washington, D.C. and Maryland area"); Affidavit of Frank Zotto
I 7(h), Physicians Data, Inc. v. Quest Wireless, L.L.C., Case No. OOCV631 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
June 28, 2001) (reporting results of "random sampling of 38 arbitrators on the Commercial
Panel in the Denver, Colorado area"). All of the affidavits are included in the CD-ROM Ap-
pendix to F. Paul Bland, Jr. et al., Consumer Arbitration Agreements: Enforceability and
Other Topics (4th ed. 2004); see also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing "average daily rate of arbitrator compensation in Northern California" as $1899),
affrd in part and revd in part, 319 E3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18, 26.
30. The AAA has reported that it "administered 386 pro bono construction cases in
2002," see Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Public Service at the American Arbitration Association 8
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A pair of studies have looked at the arbitrators' fees actually
charged in AAA employment (but not consumer) arbitration. Ac-
cording to Elizabeth Hill, the mean arbitrators' fee paid by
employees arbitrating under employer-promulgated plans (before
the cost caps imposed above) was $1706." Alexander Colvin's more
recent study, examining employment data disclosed by the AAA
per California law, found that "the median arbitrator fee amongst
all cases was $2,472 and the mean fee was $6,105." s2 He added that
"[iln 96.6 percent of the cases in this sample the employer paid
100 percent of the arbitrator fees.
33
C. Attorneys'Fees and Other Litigation Expenses
The third component of the costs of arbitration is the attorneys'
fees and other expenses paid by the parties. Attorneys' fees are not
governed by the AAA arbitration rules; instead, they are a matter of
parties' private contractual arrangements. Attorneys' fees and other
expenses are important because, if arbitration is to be cheaper than
litigation (or even no more expensive than litigation), they must be
less than comparable costs in litigation. The other two components
of arbitration costs almost always will be greater than or at best the
same as comparable costs in court.
The following can be said about attorneys' fees in arbitration:
First, some consumers and employees appear pro se in arbitra-
tion. 4 These parties by definition pay no attorneys' fees.
Second, many consumers and employees are represented by at-
torneys on a contingent-fee basis.35 As a result, they pay no
attorneys' fees upfront, and pay their attorney only a percentage of
any award they eventually obtain.6 I know of no empirical evidence
(2004), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3448, but I am unaware of similar data for
consumer or employment cases.
31. Hill, supra note 19, at 798, 812.
32. Colvin, supra note 4, at 425.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 432 ("Overall in the sample of 2,760 cases, employees were represented in
2,066 cases (74.9 percent) and self-represented in 694 cases (25.1 percent)."); Hill, supra
note 19, at 818 ("One third of the P cases in this sample were prosecuted pro se.").
35. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, Disp. Resol. J.,
May-July 2003, at 8, 12 (finding, in a sample of AAA employment arbitrations, that "most
lower-income employees have agreed to representation on a contingency basis").
36. At least some anecdotal evidence suggests that attorneys advance arbitration costs
for their contingent-fee clients. Drahozal, supra note 27, at 769-70. Compare Lester Brick-
man, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lalyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 735 (2003) ("[M]any firms make no effort to seek reimbursement of
expenses if there is no recovery."), and Kevin M. Clermont &John D. Currivan, Improving on
the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. Rv. 529, 532 n.3 (1978) ("In the event of defeat, the client
SUMMER 2008]
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on the costs incurred by claimants' counsel in pursuing claims in
arbitration (as compared to litigation) .
Third, the only evidence of the actual amount of parties' attor-
neys' fees in arbitration is from fee awards made to prevailing
parties in arbitration. In her study of AAA employment arbitra-
tions, Elizabeth Hill examined a sample of twelve attorneys' fee
awards to employees who arbitrated pursuant to employer-
promulgated plans. She reported a median fee award of $6248 and
mean fee award of $14,464, with awards ranging from $2713 to
$54,192."8
D. Contract Provisions re Cost Allocation
Arbitration rules provide only a partial picture of the contractual
structure governing the costs of arbitration. The rules are standard
form contract terms that parties can incorporate by reference into
their arbitration agreements. In addition, however, the parties may
add to or change those standard terms in their contracts-subject
to possible constraints imposed by the due process protocols of
arbitration providers."s1 This section examines empirical evidence
on the terms governing costs in consumer, employment, and fran-
chise arbitration agreements.
Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler examined arbitration
clauses from a variety of consumer contracts along an array of di-
mensions, including arbitration costs.40 Table 3 reproduces their
results. They found that just over half (30 of 52, or 57.7%) of the
clauses included some provision on costs, with the most common
requiring that the parties share all expenses equally (16 of 52, or
30.8%). Only a handful (3 of 52, or 5.8%) permitted the prevailing
party to recover all expenses, while another pair of clauses (2 of 52,
theoretically must refund all of these litigation expenses advanced by the lawyer.... [In]
[alctual practice, however, ... the client usually does not pay back these expenses."), with
Hill, supra note 35, at 10-11 ("Even lawyers who represent employees on a contingency basis
usually require that their expenses be paid up front.").
37. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).
38. Hill, supra note 19, at 798-99.
39. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do (and
Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655, 656 (2007) ("In some cases, the result
[of the due process protocol] may be an arbitration process that is less 'one-sided' than the
clause itself would suggest."). No empirical evidence is available as yet on the extent to
which contract terms are overridden or otherwise constrained by due process protocols.
40. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predis-
pute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 71.
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or 3.8%) permitted the prevailing party to recover some expenses.
Only one clause (1.9%) capped the consumer's fees, and another
four (7.7%) provided for some reimbursement of consumer ex-




ARBITRATION EXPENSES MENTIONED IN
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CLAUSES4 2
Number of Percentage
Clauses
Mention of expenses 30 57.7%
All expenses 16 30.8%
Divided equally 13 25.0%
Loser pays 3 5.8%
Partial expenses 14 26.9%
Non-fee expenses divided equally 1 1.9%
Initiator pays filing fee 3 5.8%
Initiator pays all arbitration fees 1 1.9%
Arbitrator decides fee allocation 2 3.8%
Provision for some consumer reimbursement of fees 4 7.7%
Loser pays some or all fees 2 3.8%
Cap consumer's portion of fees 1 1.9%
Provide for indigency 12 23.1%
No mention of expenses 22 42.3%
Bickner et al. surveyed thirty-six employers about their employ-
ment dispute resolution programs in 1996.43 They reported that:
About half of the plans called for the employer to pay
arbitration fees, the other half providing for shared costs. For
the most part, shared costs mean a 50-50 split, but a few plans
provided for disproportionate payment.... Several plans
specified that the employer would pay if the fees imposed a
financial hardship on the employee, while several interviewees
expressed an informal willingness to pay part or all of an
41. Demaine and Hensler also found that half the clauses contained a provision per-
mitting claimants to bring their claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration if they so
chose. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 40, at 65 ("Sixteen of the fifty-two clauses (30.8%)
exempt small claims from the arbitration requirement. Half of these clauses state that either
party may pursue an action in small claims court; the other half state that the business will
refrain from invoking the clause if the consumer pursues an action in small claims court.").
42. Id. at 71.
43. .Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DIsp. RESOL. J., Jan.
1997, at 8, 81.
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employee's costs even where the plan did not specifically
provide for doing so."
Although the findings are dated, they provide some picture of the
terms of employment dispute resolution plans.
Drahozal and Wittrock compared the arbitration clauses in a
sample of franchise agreements in 1999 and 2007. . As Table 4 re-
veals, they found no dramatic changes in the nature of the cost•• 46
provisions. One notable difference from the consumer arbitration
clauses studied by Demaine and Hensler was that a much higher
proportion of franchise arbitration clauses permitted the prevail-
ing party to recover its costs of arbitration. 7 Conversely, fewer of
the franchise arbitration clauses included provisions dealing with
indigent claimants. The relatively greater resources of franchisees
as compared to consumers may explain the differing provisions.
TABLE 4




Bear own costs with exceptions (21.4%) (21.4%)
11 11
Prevailing party (39.3%) (39.3%)
3 5
Franchisor as prevailing party (10.7%) (17.9%)
1 1
Share arbitrators' fees (3.6%) (3.6%)
0 1
Cost assistance by franchisor (0%) (3.6%)
7 4
No provision (25.0%) (14.3%)
44. Id.
45. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitra-
tion? 39-40 (Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 735-36 (reporting results for 1999 alone) ("[Flifty percent
(17 of 34) of the franchise agreements with arbitration clauses ... contained fee-shifting
provisions.... Thirty percent (10 of 34) of arbitration clauses contained some provision
specifying how arbitrators were to assess costs.").
46. The number of clauses permitting the prevailing party to recover its costs re-
mained the same, and there was a slight increase in the number of clauses permitting the
franchisor as prevailing party to recover its costs.
47. As I have noted elsewhere, fee-shifting provisions are located in various parts of
franchise agreements, not only the dispute resolution clauses. Drahozal, supra note 45, at
735 n.296. As a result, Table 4 may understate the use of fee-shifting provisions in franchise
agreements.
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E. Total Arbitration Costs
In her study of AAA employment arbitrations, Hill sought to es-
timate the total costs faced by employees in addition to reporting
the individual components of arbitration costs. Her estimated fig-
ures for each step of the process are based on the mean (or, in one
case, median) fees paid by employees in the sample. 48 Note again
that this cost data predated the AAA's imposition of a cap on ad-
ministrative and arbitrators' fees paid by employees arbitrating
under employer-promulgated plans.
Table 5 summarizes her estimates. Row 1 shows that 32% of em-
ployees paid nothing for arbitration-no attorneys' fees, no forum
fees, no arbitrators' fees. Row 5 reflects an additional 29% of em-
ployees who paid no forum fees or arbitrators' fees, but who Hill
estimates did pay attorneys' fees. Overall, based on Hill's estimates,
45% of employees paid less than $1200 (including any forum fees,
arbitrators' fees, and attorneys' fees) to bring a claim in arbitra-
tion, while the remaining 55% paid no more than $8540 to bring a
claim in arbitration. Excluding attorneys' fees (which Hill deems
appropriate because most of the employees who had attorneys
were represented on a contingent-fee basis), "[t]he remaining
costs of arbitration, forum fees, average only $2,292."49
TABLE 5
TOTAL ARBITRATION COSTS FOR AAA
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION °
Fees Paid by Employees Cases Pro Se Cases with Attorney Total Cases (%)
39
1. None 29 10 3(32.23%)
2. Less than Maximum Hearing/ 5 2 7
Filing Fee ($783) (5.8%)
8
3. One-Half of Forum Fees ($1146) 5 361 (6.61%)
4. All Forum Fees ($6292) 1 0 ((0.83%)
35
5. Attorneys' Fees ($6248) 0 35(89 (28.9%)
6. Attorneys' Fees plus One-Half of 0 4 4
Arbitrators' Fees ($6776) (3.3%)
7. Attorneys' Fees plus One-Half of 0 23 23
Forum Fees ($7394) (19.0%)
48. Hill, supra note 19, at 799-800.
49. Id. at 803.
50. Id. at 801.
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Fees Paid by Employees Cases Pro Se Cases with Attorney Total Cases (%)
8. Attorneys' Fees plus all Arbitrator 0 2 2
Fees ($7954) (1.65%)
9. Attorneys' Fees plus all Forum 0 2 2
Fees ($8540) (1.65%)
121
10. Totals 40 81 
10%
(100%)
II. COSTS OF ARBITRATION VS. COSTS OF LITIGATION
If all that is considered is administrative costs and arbitrators'
fees, arbitration will almost always be more expensive than litiga-
tion. Those costs are highly subsidized in litigation, while the
parties bear the full amount of those costs in arbitration. Accord-
ingly, for arbitration to be cheaper than litigation, the parties must
save on attorneys' fees and other litigation costs, and those savings
must exceed the additional administrative costs and arbitrators'
fees they must pay in arbitration.
This part examines the available empirical evidence comparing
the costs of arbitration to the costs of litigation. That evidence con-
sists of (1) surveys of parties and attorneys about their perceptions
of arbitration and litigation costs; (2) studies of business experi-
ence with defense costs in arbitration and litigation cases; and (3) a
direct comparative study of the costs of arbitration and litigation.
Not all of the evidence is limited exclusively to consumer and em-
ployee arbitrations, but it is the best available. The part concludes
with a brief discussion of possible methodologies for a more accu-
rate comparison of arbitration and litigation costs.
A. Surveys
A number of surveys have asked parties and attorneys to com-
pare the costs of arbitration and the costs of litigation. Table 6
describes the surveys, while Figure 1 summarizes the findings. The
respondents in the studies ranged from adults who had partici-
pated in "voluntary" arbitration to trial lawyers to general counsel.
The majority (if not the substantial majority) of survey respondents
(51%-89%) stated that arbitration was "less expensive" or "more
cost effective" than litigation. Most of the remaining respondents
51. After reviewing this same evidence, Peter B. Rutledge concludes as follows: "Virtually
all of the available evidence--studies of analogous regimes, surveys, and case studies--suggests
... that arbitration, as a necessary part of a broader fabric of alternative dispute resolution
programs, can significantly reduce a company's process costs." Rutledge, supra note 4.
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(11%-47%) reported "no difference" in cost. Few stated that arbi-
tration was more expensive than litigation (0% to 11%).
TABLE 6
SURVEYS OF PARTY AND ATTORNEY
VIEWS ON ARBITRATION COSTS
Title of Study Subjects Surveyed Number of Responses
2005 Harris Interactive Adults who participated in 609 responses; sub-sample of
survey' arbitration "voluntarily" national cross-section of adults
2003 ABA Task Force on Trial lawyers, both plaintiff oriented 627 responses; 10% response
ADR Effectiveness" and defense oriented" rate"
2004 Ernst & Young survey '  Consumer claimants involved in 29 responses from 175 target
NAF arbitration respondents
2003 Corporate Legal Times General counsel and other in-house Unspecified
email survey" counsel
1990 AAA survey" Law firms in North Carolina and 33 of 48 law firms contacted
South Carolina responded '
52. U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper, and Faster
Than Litigation 21 (2005), available at http://adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf. The question asked was: "Thinking about
the total costs (including filing fees and lawyers' fees), do you think arbitration was cheaper
or more expensive than going to court?" Id.
53. Online survey was of 609 adults who had participated in arbitration "voluntarily,
due to contract language, or with strong urging by the court, but not ordered into arbitra-
tion by a court." Id. at 4. Only 19% of the survey respondents participated in arbitration
because a contract so required. Id. at 9.
54. ABA Section of Litigation Task Force on ADR Effectiveness, Survey on Arbitration
10, 19 (Aug. 2003). The question asked was: "do you consider voluntary arbitration to be
more cost effective or less cost effective than litigation, when the total 'process costs' (legal
fees, witness fees, discovery costs, arbitrator fees and costs, etc.) are compared to the value of
the matter in controversy?"
55. The trial lawyers surveyed were members of the ABA Litigation Section: 60% rep-
resented an equal mixture of defendants and plaintiffs, 26% were "defense oriented", and
14% were "plaintiff oriented." Id. at 3.
56. Of those (87) who responded that arbitration was less cost effective, the most com-
mon reasons were: "Arbitrator's fees and costs" 46.0%; "Administrative expenses" 17.2%;
"Additional legal fees required" 11.5%; "Hearing costs" 4.6%; and "Other" 20.7%. Id. at 20.
57. Ernst & Young, Outcomes of Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Consumer Lend-
ing Cases 11-12 (2004), available at http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf.
58. Michael T. Burr, The Truth About ADI- Do Arbitration and Mediation Really Work?, COR-
PORATE LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 2004, at 44, 48, available at http://www.cpradr.org/pressroom/
press29.pdf. The question asked was: "How do arbitration and summary jury trial processes
compare to traditional adjudication processes, in terms of cost, time to resolution and fairness?"
59. Lisa Brener, Cost and Value of Arbitration, 14 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 111,
114 (2003). According to Brener, "[t]he firms claimed an average of thirty-two percent sav-
ings in arbitration. They further estimated that forty-five percent of their case preparation
time in litigation was spent on discovery, but only seventeen percent of their preparation
time in arbitration was spent on discovery." Id.
60. The percentage of respondents indicating that arbitration was equally as expensive
as litigation or more expensive than litigation is not reported, so I assumed that all of the
remaining 11% of respondents indicated that litigation was more expensive than arbitration.
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The one survey described in Table 6 but not appearing in Figure
1 was an Ernst & Young survey of consumer claimants in NAF arbi-
trations. 1 The NAF has been harshly criticized for its consumer
arbitrations, the vast majority of which are brought by businesses
against consumers."2 Ernst and Young conducted telephone inter-
views with twenty-nine consumer claimants (out of 175 target
respondents)." Of the twenty-nine respondents, ten prevailed in an
award, four did not, and fifteen settled.64 Only four (14%) were
represented by counsel in the arbitration; the rest proceeded pro
61. Jill Gross and Barbara Black recently reported the results of a survey of all parties
involved in customer securities arbitrations completed between January 1, 2005 and Decem-
ber 31, 2006. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration 12
(Univ. of Cincinnati, Research Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1090969 (25,283 surveys mailed and 3087 responses received,
for a response rate of 13.0%). A subset of the respondents had been involved in a recent
civil case as well as a securities arbitration. The survey asked those respondents whether they
would choose arbitration in the future. Id. at 48. The possible responses included "I would
choose arbitration over court" or "I would not choose arbitration" for various reasons-
including "because it is more expensive." Of the 1077 respondents, 35.6% indicated they
would choose arbitration over litigation and 7.3% that they would not choose arbitration
because it was "more expensive." Id. The others either were not sure or would not choose
arbitration for some other reason. Id.
62. Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Con-
sumers (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Finalwcover.pdf.
63. Ernst & Young, supra note 57, at 11.
64. Id. at 11-12.
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se.6 ' One of the survey questions was the following: "How would
you characterize the costs associated with arbitration? (1 is very un-
affordable and 5 is very affordable.")66 The mean response was
4.29, close to the "very affordable" end of the spectrum."
While the survey results described in this section suggest that
many parties and lawyers believe that arbitration costs less than
litigation, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions based on
these surveys. Most of the surveys are not limited to consumer and
employment arbitration. Several of the surveys were unclear
whether they referred to court-annexed arbitration, arbitration
pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause, or some other form of
arbitration. Indeed, the 2005 Harris survey was limited to persons
who participated in arbitration "voluntarily, due to contract lan-
guage, or with strong urging by the court, but not ordered into
arbitration by a court," which would include some but not all forms
of court-annexed and contractual arbitration, and only one-fifth
were required to arbitrate by contract.66 And what people say they
do or believe is not necessarily what they actually do or believe,
which is an inherent limitation of any sort of survey.
B. Business Experience with Arbitration
Several studies have examined how the costs of arbitration com-
pare to the costs of litigation among businesses.6 A 1988 study
compared defense costs of customer-broker disputes in court with
defense costs of "similar" disputes in arbitration and found that the
"average cost of defending customer-broker disputes in court was
$20,000 per case as compared with $8,000 per case in arbitration."7 °
William M. Howard reported the following results from a survey of
65. Id. at 13. Because so few respondents hired a lawyer, Ernst & Young did not report
any responses on the amount that the claimants spent on legal fees, even though that was
one of the questions on the survey instrument. Id. at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11. For criticisms of the Ernst & Young study, see Ctr. for Responsible Lend-
ing, Comments on Ernst & Young Arbitration Outcomes Report (Feb. 24, 2005), http://
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib25-Ernst.YoungArbitration-Comments-0205.pdf.
68. See supra notes 52-53.
69. Business costs are only half the story, of course, and the fact that some businesses
have lower dispute resolution costs when they use arbitration does not show that consumers
and employees do as well. Nonetheless, in comparing the costs of arbitration to the costs of
litigation, business experience with both certainly is relevant.
70. G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REv. 517, 521 n.24
(1989); see also William C. Hermann, Note, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and
New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J. 697 app. at 722 (1990)
(summarizing results of study).
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lawyers who regularly represented parties in employment discrimi-
nation cases: "While the plaintiffs fees are typically contingent, the
defendants' lawyers estimated that the average fee in litigating em-
ployment discrimination cases was $96,000 as contrasted to $20,000
in arbitration."71
Meanwhile, a pair of case studies examined cost savings by em-
ployers that implemented new dispute resolution programs for
their employees. The programs were described as providing for
"ADR," but arbitration was an element of both programs. Accord-
ing to the General Accounting Office, during the first three years
after Brown and Root adopted an employee ADR program, it "re-
ported that the overall cost of dealing with workplace disputes
(including the annual cost of the ADR program itself) was less than
half of what the company had been accustomed to spending on
legal fees for employment-related litigation."72 Similarly, David
Sherwyn et al. studied the employment dispute resolution program
adopted by an anonymous business and reported that "since insti-




Perhaps the best known study comparing the costs of arbitration
and litigation remains a 1983 study by Herbert Kritzer and Jill
Anderson. 4 The study, conducted as part of the Civil Litigation Re-
search Project,75 compared the dispute resolution costs in a sample
of roughly comparable cases in state court, federal court, and AAA
arbitration. Information on the actual costs incurred by the parties
was obtained from the parties' attorneys in each of the cases. 76 The
study is not limited to consumer or employment cases, but does
include consumer cases (i.e., insurance cases) in the sample.77
71. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does
Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. RESOL.J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44.
72. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Employers' Experi-
ences with ADR in the Workplace 19 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GGD-97-157.
73. Sherwyn et al., supra note 10, at 1589.
74. Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative
Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association
and the Courts, 8JUsT. Svs.J. 6 (1983).
75. Herbert M. Kritzer, Studying Disputes: Learning from the CLRP Experience, 15 LAw &
Soc'v REv. 503 (1980-81).
76. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 74, at 8-9.
77. Id. at 8.
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Kritzer and Anderson found that the lowest cost dispute resolu-
tion process varied depending on the amount at stake in the case.
They stated:
Across the range of stakes values, no one institution emerges
as most or least expensive. The AAA is least expensive for
small cases, and most expensive for the remaining three cate-
gories. Federal court is least expensive in the $5,000 to
$10,000 range, and state court is least expensive in the upper
two ranges."
Although these results might be viewed as consistent with the
general description of arbitration costs in Part I,79 a partial explana-
tion derives instead from differences in the process provided.
Kritzer and Anderson reported the actual average cost of the cases
studied for both arbitration and litigation. In arbitration, however,
"a much larger proportion of cases go through the 'complete
process,' including a hearing and an award." ° Thus, a partial ex-
planation (at least) for the lower costs for some cases in litigation
was that on average those cases ended earlier in the process, i.e.,
before trial. Parties were paying for the additional process pro-
vided in arbitration.
It is difficult to generalize from the Kritzer and Anderson re-
sults, both because of the age of the study and the types of cases
studied. Nevertheless, it provides an interesting perspective on the
comparative costs of arbitration and litigation.
D. Future Research
An important challenge for future empirical studies comparing
the costs of arbitration to the costs of litigation (as well as other
sorts of studies comparing arbitration and litigation) is the
difficulty of controlling for differences in case characteristics: a
case may be less costly to arbitrate (or litigate) not because of
differences between arbitration and litigation, but because the case
itself is simpler and less complex. Any study that retrospectively
78. Id. at 17.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. That is, because of low-cost consumer
and employment arbitration (although it did not exist at the time of the Kritzer and Ander-
son study), arbitration is no more expensive (and may be cheaper) than litigation for small
and mid-sized claims. But for larger claims, the higher administrative and arbitrators' fees
may make arbitration more expensive than litigation. As discussed in the text, however, at
least in part the actual explanation is a different one.
80. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 74, at 17.
SUMMER 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
compares cases in arbitration and litigation will face the difficulty
that no two cases are alike.81
One approach to dealing with questions of comparability is to
use simulations. A sample of actual case files and actual attorneys'
fee billings would be the starting point. Ideally, some of the files
would be for cases in court and some for cases in arbitration. The
actual billings would provide a baseline for comparison. The files
then could be submitted to a sample of attorneys to estimate what
their fees would be for handling the cases either in arbitration or
litigation. The results of these simulations could then be compared
to the actual costs for the dispute in question.
A second approach would be to use similar disputes arising out
of a common set of contracts, some of which have arbitration
clauses and some of which do not."s As a simple example, Jeffrey R.
Cruz reports his experience with two cases that arose out of similar
contracts for the design and construction of power plants, one of
which was in arbitration and one of which was in litigation. 4 A
much larger and more comparable sample of cases would be nec-
essary to draw any meaningful conclusions about comparative
costs.
A third approach would be to use random assignment of dis-
putes between arbitration and litigation to overcome the
comparability problem. Ian Ayres writes in Super Crunchers of com-
panies that undertake randomized experiments to determine
pricing, effective sales techniques, or attention-getting web pages.88
Companies might randomly include arbitration clauses in con-
tracts and study the disposition of any disputes that arise8 6 Or they
might randomly assign disputes that arise to litigation and arbitra-
tion and study how the resolution of the disputes compares.8s
81. See supra text accompanying note 10.
82. Drahozal & Naimark, supra note 7, at 20.
83. Id.
84. Jeffrey R. Cruz, Arbitration vs. Litigation: An Unintentional Experiment, Disp. RESOL.J.,
Nov. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 10. Cruz does not address the comparative cost of the two cases, but
concludes that in his pair of cases "[a] rbitration led to a resolution in much less time overall
and allowed the parties to customize the process to a complex construction case." Id. at 15.
85. IAN AYREs, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO
BE SMART 46-63 (2007).
86. One complication from this approach is that the presence or absence of an arbi-
tration clause might affect the number and nature of disputes that arise under the contracts.
While that itself would be an interesting study, it would complicate any attempt to isolate
differences in dispute resolution costs.
87. Actually, it may be that companies already have done so but have not reported the
results publicly.
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III. ARBITRATION COSTS AND ACCESSIBILITY
Comparing the costs of arbitration with the costs of litigation
certainly is important in evaluating the efficiency of the two proc-
esses."8 But the question of cost is distinct from (although
certainly related to) the question of whether arbitration is a more
or less accessible forum for consumers and employees. Whether a
claim is economically viable depends both on the cost of pursuing
the claim and the claimant's potential recovery on the claim. 9 If
the potential recovery is enough lower in arbitration, claimants
may be less likely to pursue a claim in arbitration than in litiga-
tion even if the costs are lower as well. Thus, the discussion of
arbitration costs in the previous part cannot be viewed in isola-
tion in evaluating accessibility, but rather must be considered
together with empirical evidence on expected outcomes and re-
coveries in arbitration."
This part, by comparison, examines evidence that deals directly
with the question of whether arbitration is a more or less accessi-
ble forum than litigation for consumer and employee claimants.
No systematic empirical evidence is available on the number of
claims that parties decline to bring because of the costs of arbitra-
tion (or the costs of litigation for that matter), although sources
have described anecdotal reports of excessive costs precluding a
claimant from pursuing a claim in arbitration.9' Instead, the em-
pirical evidence of accessibility consists of several types.
The first type is evidence of differing characteristics of claim-
ants in arbitration and litigation. Eisenberg and Hill reported:
We were unable to compare litigation and arbitration results
for lower-paid employees due to the lack of data about litiga-
tion commenced by employees in this economic group. We
believe the absence of cases of this type is likely explained by
the fact that lower-paid employees seem to lack ready access
to court, as other researchers have reported.92
88. Of course, if the overall efficiency of the processes were the inquiry, one would
need to compare the total costs of the public court system, including judges' salaries and
administrative expenses, to the total costs of arbitration, to make a proper comparison.
89. Drahozal, supra note 27, at 760-62.
90. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing
the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MicH.J.L. REFORM 843 (2008).
91. The Costs of Arbitration, supra note 3, at 19.
92. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44, 45; see also Hill,
supra note 19, at 804 ("72% of the employees in this sample who arbitrated pursuant to
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In other words, the absence of court cases brought by lower-paid
employees as compared to the presence of arbitration cases
brought by such employees suggests that arbitration is a more ac-
cessible forum for such claimants.
The second type of evidence on accessibility is evidence of the
amounts claimed by consumers and employees in arbitration.
Plaintiffs' lawyers interviewed by William Howard indicated that
they normally required "minimum provable damages of $60,000
to $65,000" before they would be willing to bring an employment
discrimination case in court.94 By comparison, several sources find
that claimants bring claims in arbitration seeking amounts far less
than $60,000. For example, the National Workrights Institute
states:
The Institute looked at all AAA employment arbitrations for
the year 2000 for which there was a stated demand. In the
majority of these cases. (54%), the demand was less than
$75,000. Many cases (26%) involved claims of less than
$25,000. In other words, half of the people whose employ-
ment claims were heard by AAA that year would not have
been able to bring their claims to court.95
While the evidence of claim amounts in arbitration seems reli-
able, it would be helpful to have additional evidence of the
minimum amounts necessary for a claim to be brought in court.
Finally, a study of challenges to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on grounds of excessive cost brought in federal court
"suggests that in a substantial majority of those reported cases in
which courts invalidated the arbitration agreement on cost
grounds, arbitration costs may well not have been a barrier to as-
serting the claim in arbitration. '" 96 The study found that cases in
promulgated agreements were of low to middle income and did not earn enough income to
gain access to the courts with an employment-related claim.").
93. This evidence is related to the first type, at least in employment cases, because the
amount of an employee's claim is likely to depend on the employee's salary.
94. Howard, supra note 71, at 44.
95. Nat'l Workrights Inst., Employment Arbitration: What Does the Data Show?,
http://www.workrights.org/current/cd_arbitration.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007); e.g.,
O'Neal & Solin, supra note 24, at 8 (noting that of 13,810 securities arbitration cases in sam-
ple, 3193 sought less than $10,000 and 3158 sought between $10,000 and $50,000); see also
Lewis Maltby, Arbitrating Employment Disputes: The Promise and the Peni4 in ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 530, 533 (Daniel P. O'Meara ed., 2002).
96. Drahozal, supra note 27, at 777. For an earlier study of cost-based challenges, see
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REv. 143, 196
(2002) ("[O]ur research ... shows that resistance to mandatory arbitration agreements is an
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which courts invalidate clauses on cost grounds are similar in im-
portant respects to those in which courts refuse to invalidate
clauses.97 A main difference seems to be the circuit in which the
case was brought.98 Although the study does not purport to ad-
dress whether arbitration is an accessible forum, it does suggest
that the courts are not doing a good job of identifying those cases
in which arbitration costs are in fact a barrier to claimants bring-
ing their claims.
IV. CLASS ARBITRATION
Because arbitration clauses prevent a case from proceeding as a
class action in court, they have been touted as a means of reduc-
ing the risk that a company will face class action liability.9
Conversely, however, the unavailability of class relief may be prob-
lematic for some employee and consumer claimants if their claim
cannot be brought economically on an individual basis in arbitra-
tion.'0 There is no empirical evidence on the frequency of such
claims. But much of the concern about the accessibility of the ar-
bitral forum is actually a concern about the effect of arbitration
clauses on the availability of class relief.10'
The recent development of class arbitration (i.e., class actions
in arbitration, rather than in court) provides a possible means by
which claimants can vindicate small claims that could not be
brought economically on an individual basis in arbitration (or in
court). Although class arbitration has been around for several
decades, 102 its use increased dramatically after the Supreme
Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle in 2003.13
uphill struggle, because courts continue to reject most of these challenges. However, not-
withstanding the strong signals sent by Gilmer and Circuit City, courts are more receptive to
these challenges than is generally understood.").
97. Drahozal, supra note 27, at 777 (highlighting such factors as representation by
counsel and the assertion of a claim under a statute permitting a prevailing claimant to
recover attorneys' fees).
98. Id. at 756-57.
99. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141,142 (1997).
100. Of course, class actions are not the only means of enhancing the incentives to
bring small claims in court. For example, fee-shifting statutes provide an incentive for an
attorney to take a case even if the amount at stake is too small for the claim to be economi-
cally viable otherwise. See supra text accompanying note 38.
101. Drahozal, supra note 27, at 775-77.
102. The California Court of Appeal ordered arbitration to proceed on a class basis in
the well-known Southland case. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal.
1982), revd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also
SUMMER 2008]
836 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 41:4
The AAA Class Arbitration docket provides a source of data on
the use of class arbitration.0 Figure 2 shows the trend in filings of
class arbitrations with the AAA. 10 5 Claimants filed roughly fifty
cases a year from 2004 to 2006, and then filings declined some-
what to thirty-six in 2007. Whether the decline is permanent
(perhaps due to increased use of class arbitration waivers) 0 6 or
simply temporary is too early to tell. Certainly the docket is active,
and provides a possible alternative for at least some claimants
who cannot bring a class action in court because they have agreed
to arbitrate.
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
103. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). Effective October 8, 2003, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion promulgated Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations. Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 [hereinafter AAA Class Arbitration Rules]. The AAA
will administer class arbitrations "if (1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes
arising out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any
of the Association's rules, and (2) the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, con-
solidation orjoinder of claims." Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Policy on Class Arbitrations (effective
July 14, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28779. If the arbitration agreement
"prohibits class claims, consolidation orjoinder," the AAA will not administer a demand for
class arbitration "unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute to
submit any aspect of their dispute involving class claims, consolidation, joinder or the en-
forceability of such provisions, to an arbitrator or to the Association." Id. JAMS has also
promulgated class arbitration rules. SeeJAMS Class Action Procedures (Feb. 2005), available
at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/class.action.asp.
104. The AAA Class Arbitration Docket is available on the AAA web site, and includes
not only the names of the parties and their counsel, but also copies of the demand for arbi-
tration, notices of hearings (including the date, time and place of the hearing), and copies
of any awards. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Searchable Class Arbitration Docket,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). Party filings are not avail-
able on the web site, nor are hearing transcripts or exhibits. The AAA Class Arbitration
Rules depart from the usual practice of secrecy in arbitration: "The presumption of privacy
and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not apply in class arbitrations." AAA
Class Arbitration Rules, supra note 103 (Rule 9(a)).
105. The data on AAA class arbitration filings in Figure 2 comes from the AAA Class
Arbitration Docket. I appreciate Mark Weidemaier providing me with data through early
2007. I collected updated data as of March 6, 2008.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 110-120.
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Little empirical work has been done on AAA (or other) class ar-
bitrations. No published studies have looked at the outcomes of
class arbitrations, presumably because (like class actions in court)
most cases are settled. Some sort of evaluation would need to be
done before the suitability of class arbitration as a substitute for
class actions could be evaluated.
The only published study of AAA class arbitration awards was by
Deruelle and Roesch, who examined all "clause construction
awards" published on the AAA class arbitration docket.1 °7 "Clause
construction awards" are awards that determine whether the par-
ties' arbitration agreement permits arbitration to proceed on a
class basis.10'8 Deruelle and Roesch reported that, "[a]s of June 15,
2007, AAA arbitrators have rendered 51 Clause Construction
Awards concerning otherwise silent arbitration agreements, and in
all but two of those decisions, the arbitrators have allowed classwide
proceedings."'09 Thus, when the arbitration clause is silent on the
availability of class arbitration, AAA arbitrators have consistently
permitted the arbitration to proceed on a class basis.
A possible response to the growth of class arbitration would be
for the party drafting the arbitration clause to include language in
107. P. Christine Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming the Rigged Class Arbitration
Game: How We Got Here and Where We Go Now-Part I, METROPOLITAN CoRP. COUNS., Aug.
2007, at 9, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2O07/August/09.pdf.
108. AAA Class Arbitration Rules, supra note 103 (Rule 3).
109. Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 107, at 9.
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the clause precluding the arbitration from proceeding on a class
basis, in other words, language waiving class arbitration. Justice
Stevens predicted as much during oral argument in Bazzle." ° The
available empirical evidence is mixed on the extent to which draft-
ers include class arbitration waivers in their arbitration clauses."' In
their study of consumer arbitration clauses, Demaine and Hensler
found that "[s]ixteen of the fifty-two arbitration clauses (30.8%)
explicitly prohibit class actions with the arbitration proceeding,
and none of the remaining clauses explicitly provide for class ac-
tions."' 12 More recently, in the paper they prepared for this
symposium, Eisenberg et al. reported that 100% (20 of 20) of the
consumer arbitration clauses in their sample (principally in credit
card and cell phone contracts) included class arbitration waivers.
By comparison, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, in her study of dis-
pute resolution clauses in software licensing agreements, found
that "[n]ot a single EULA out of 597 includes a class-action
waiver."'" 4 Based on her findings, Marotta-Wurgler argues that
[a]lthough much analysis remains to be done, these results
immediately cast doubt on casual claims that sellers' rampant
110. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003) (No. 02-634), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/02-634.pdf ("Does this case have any real future significance, because
isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will prohibit class ac-
tions?") (StevensJ.).
111. Although courts (and some commentators) commonly refer to these sorts of provi-
sions as "class action waivers," it is more accurate to call them "class arbitration waivers." It is
the arbitration clause, without any additional language, which precludes the claimant from
being party to a class action in court. Thus, the arbitration clause itself is the class action
waiver. The additional language excluding class relief in arbitration is not a class action
waiver, but rather a class arbitration waiver.
112. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 40, at 65. Mark Weidemaier found a much smaller
frequency of class arbitration waivers in a sample of arbitration clauses in AAA class arbitra-
tions. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIz. L. REv.
69, 85 n.102 (2007) ("Of [a sample of 32 agreements in AAA class arbitrations], 5 of the 16
(31%) of the consumer agreements forbid class actions, but none of the 16 employment
agreements contains a similar term."). The smaller frequency of class arbitration waivers is
not surprising, given that the AAA refuses to administer class arbitrations when the arbitra-
tion clause includes a class arbitration waiver, unless directed to do so by a court. See supra
note 103.
113. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008).
By comparison, none (0 of 13) of the employment contracts (which, given that their data
source for these contracts was SEC filings, would have been employment contracts of corpo-
rate executives) and only 2 of 7 (28.6%) of the other "material" contracts in their sample
included class arbitration waivers. Id.
114. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair"Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 51 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007).
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use of choice of forum and arbitration clauses deprive buyers
of their day in court, or that sellers are shielding themselves
from liability by making it impossible for buyers to aggregate
low-value claims. "5
There is evidence, however, that the use of class arbitration
waivers has increased in recent years, at least in certain types of
contracts. Drahozal and Wittrock compare franchise agreements
from identical franchisors in 1999 and 2007.116 Their results show
that the percentage of franchise arbitration clauses with class arbi-
tration waivers increased from 53.6% of the clauses in 1999 to
78.6% of the clauses in 2007. '17 Variations in the provisions of the
class arbitration provisions are shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7
CLASS ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTION
PROVISIONS IN FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS
1999 2007
15 22
Class arbitration waiver (53.6%) (78.6%)
Waives class arbitration 11(39.3%) 15 (53.6%)
Waives class relief; includes severability provision 0 (0%) 3(10.7%)
Waives class relief; includes option re provider 0 (0%) 1 (3.6%)
No joinder or consolidation 2(7.1%) 2(7.1%)
Individual proceedings only 2 (7.1%) 1(3.6%)
Permits class arbitration for specified type of claim; 2 2
otherwise waives class arbitration (7.1%) (7.1%)
Permits consolidation and class actions in court, but 1 1
waives class arbitration (3.6%) (3.6%)
10 3
None (35.7%) (10.7%)
One noteworthy variation is the inclusion in arbitration clauses
of what has been called a "non-severability" provision, providing
that if the class arbitration waiver is held unenforceable, then the
entire arbitration clause is unenforceable. "8 Drahozal and Wittrock
found that over 10% (3 of 28) of franchise arbitration clauses in
115. Id.
116. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 45, at 21-22.
117. Id. at 37.
118. In other words, the clause provides that the class arbitration waiver is not severable
from the rest of the arbitration clause, rendering the entire arbitration clause invalid if the
class arbitration waiver is invalid.
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2007 included non-severability provisions,"9 while Eisenberg et al.
reported that 60% (12 of 20) of the consumer arbitration clauses
in their sample included such provisions.
°1 2
Given the number of courts that have held class arbitration
waivers unenforceable, such non-severability provisions may result
in an increasing number of cases returning to court as class ac-
tions. ' Thus, the effect of arbitration clauses on the availability of
class relief remains an open question.
CONCLUSION
Any conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence on arbitra-
tion costs and accessibility are necessarily tentative given the
limited research to date and the challenges inherent in such re-
search. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests the following
about the costs of arbitration and whether arbitration is an accessi-
ble forum for consumers and employees.
1. For some categories of disputes, administrative fees and arbi-
trators' fees exceed the filing fees in court. But provider
organizations have capped those fees for small consumer claims
and many employee claims, so that upfront costs in arbitration for
those claims should be very similar to upfront costs in court.
Whether arbitration is more or less costly than litigation overall
depends on how attorneys' fees and other costs compare. Survey
evidence and business experience provides some evidence that the
total costs of arbitration are lower than in litigation, but the evi-
dence is too limited to draw definitive conclusions.
2. The empirical evidence suggests that arbitration may be a
more accessible forum than court for lower income employees and
consumers with small claims. Consumers and employees bring
claims in arbitration that would not be economical to bring in liti-
gation. For employees and consumers with larger claims the
evidence is less clear. Whether arbitration is a more (or less) acces-
sible forum for such parties depends on how attorneys' fees and
other costs, as well as expected recoveries, compare in arbitration
and litigation.
3. Finally, the evidence is particularly uncertain for claimants
whose claims are only economical to bring on a class basis. The
119. Id. at 33-34.
120. Eisenberg etal., supranote 113, at885.
121. For further discussion of this point, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Franchising Class Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL
Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
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extent of such claims is unclear, particularly when the availability of
statutory fee-shifting provisions is taken into account. Nor has the
suitability of class arbitration as a substitute for class actions been
systematically studied. Finally, the growing use of class arbitration
waivers (particularly when coupled with non-severability provi-
sions) raises a host of issues that are only beginning to be studied.
More research is needed-on class arbitration and on arbitration
costs in general.

